Key management in wireless sensor networks faces several unique challenges. The scale, resource limitations, and new threats such as node capture suggest the use of innetwork key generation. However, the cost of such schemes is often high because their security is based on computational complexity. Recently, several research contributions justified experimentally that the wireless channel itself can be used to generate information-theoretic secure keys. By exchanging sampling messages during device movement, a bit string is derived known only to the two involved entities. Yet, movement is not the only option to generate randomness: the channel response strongly depends on the signal frequency as well. In this work, we introduce a key generation protocol based on the frequencyselectivity of multipath fading channels. The practical advantage of this approach is that it does not require device movement during key establishment. Thus the frequent case of a sensor network with static nodes is supported. We show the protocol's applicability by implementing it on MICAz motes, and evaluating its robustness and security through experiments and analysis. The error correction property of the protocol mitigates the effects of measurement errors and temporal effects, giving rise to an agreement rate of over 97 %.
I. INTRODUCTION
S ECRET keys are essential for the security of protocols and therefore at the heart of most security designs. However, key distribution and key management face many challenges in wireless sensor networks (WSNs), mainly because of the low computational capabilities of sensor motes, their limited battery lifetime, and the lack of a private communication channel because of broadcast signal propagation. In the face of these constraints an abundance of key management protocols for WSNs has been proposed, often finely tuned for different performance and security trade-offs, and adapted to limited WSN scenarios and applications [1] , [2] . However, most of these protocols follow a conventional cryptographic approach where the secret is established either using pre-distributed keys or public-key schemes, assuming more performance-capable devices that are able to generate and distribute the keys. Although there have been efforts to adapt public key cryptographic protocols to the world of WSNs (such as TinyECC [3] and NanoECC [4] ), these adaptations usually have a significant computational complexity and memory footprint as well as a high energy consumption (for energy analysis of public key schemes, see, e.g., [5] ). This overhead reduces the available memory and energy resources, in turn limiting the space for applications running on the devices.
In recent years, there have been several research contributions that follow an alternative path towards key generation by using an information-theoretic approach to derive secrets from unauthenticated broadcast channels (see [6] for a survey). Specifically, recent results by Mathur et al. [7] and Azimi-Sadjadi et al. [8] justify that the unpredictable multipath propagation and the resulting fading behavior of wireless channels can be used to extract shared secret keys even in the presence of eavesdroppers. Yet, existing key generation protocols require that the wireless devices move randomly to produce changing signal propagation properties and thus sufficient unpredictability in their signals. Therefore, the most prevalent indoor applications of WSNs based on static sensor devices make these protocols inapplicable. Additionally, the existing protocols require hardware capabilities such as a high channel sampling frequency to mitigate errors, sufficient memory to store the measured time series, and high bandwidth and computational power to perform secret reconciliation and to generate the shared secret.
So while resource-limited devices would benefit strongly from the current information-theoretic advances in physicallayer key generation, existing protocols require the availability of sufficient hardware resources and rely on mobile computing scenarios. In this work, we lift these limitations by devising a novel key generation protocol for static WSNs. The main contributions of this work are:
• Design of a robust key generation protocol based on the frequency-selective nature of multipath fading channels that supports static channel conditions (→ Section III). • Implementation of the protocol on MICAz sensor motes and experimental analysis of its robustness and strength of derived keys, especially with respect to interdependencies between adjacent channels (→ Section IV). • Derivation of a stochastic model describing the security properties of the protocol and its validation using experimental data, providing guidelines on increasing the number of generated secret bits (→ Section V).
In summary, we demonstrate the applicability of a key generation protocol that takes advantage of multipath fading in static indoor WSNs and analyze different trade-offs between its robustness to channel deviations and the level of security provided. 25 26 Difference between means (dB) (c) Deviations between channel views. 
II. KEY GENERATION CONCEPT
In this section, we introduce the concept of key generation using the frequency-selectivity of wireless channels with multipath fading. The successful execution of this protocol depends on the ability to extract secrets at two separated positions. We require two things from the wireless channel: (i) strongly correlated information between the two legitimate parties and (ii) a high degree of uncertainty for adversaries.
A. Mutually Shared Keys by Channel Reciprocity
The principle of channel reciprocity states that two receivers experience the same channel properties when their role as sender and receiver is exchanged, given that the time interval is shorter than the coherence time t c of the channel [9, §5.4.2] . As we mainly consider static scenarios, the reciprocity between nodes is stable even if the sampling rate is small (e.g., because of hardware limitations). Our experiments show that low-cost devices such as sensor motes are able to measure signal strengths reliably with deviations of only 1-2 dB. As an example of this reciprocal behavior, Fig. 1 shows experimental results of a single sender-receiver constellation. The measurements exhibit limited deviations, i.e., the received signal strength (RSS) indicator reported by the hardware is able to capture the channel state accurately and reliably enough to enable a successful key generation. The measurements are strongly correlated but not identical because of measurement errors caused by noise in the hardware and by radio interference. This imperfect reciprocity directly influences the reliability of the proposed key generation protocol because it leads to possible disagreement in the generated bit strings. Our protocol addresses this issue with an error-correction mechanism to increase its reliability.
B. Secure Keys by Multipath Fading Channels
The unpredictability of the channel state is the most important aspect when considering the wireless channel as a source of randomness because it directly affects the security of the protocol. In related work [7] , [8] , the spatial selectivity of the wireless channel due to movement is used to generate secret bits. A change in position results in changing paths that the signal travels on, which in turn interfere at the receiver and influence the observed signal strengths. In this work, we augment this finding and show that the frequencyselectivity of multipath fading is a viable extension to generate secret information with both a higher rate and without the requirement for node movement.
Multipath fading: When considering indoor signal propagation, we observe that the signal exhibits multipath propagation characteristics [9, §5] . Each path is affected by different signal attenuation and phase shifts, and the resulting signal at the receiver is a superposition of all signal paths. A small variation in phase, e.g., by moving the sender or by using a different carrier frequency, leads to unpredictable changes in the signal strength even if signal paths are unchanged. This behavior is captured by the impulse response of the wireless channel, consisting of a number of time-shifted Dirac pulses δ, and considering L signal paths
with different values of each path for the amplitude α , phase shift φ and delay τ , acting as random variables. Because of phase shifts, interference effects lead to signal cancellation or amplification, depending on the relative phase shifts. If L is large (e.g., in indoor or urban scenarios), the impulse response is unpredictable for adversaries [10] ; recent work also confirms that sophisticated methods such as UWB ray-tracing are not practical as an attack vector [11] .
Experimental results: To show the magnitude of these effects, we conducted an experiment to evaluate the selectivity of the channel both with respect to position and carrier frequency. The experiment consists of two legitimate nodes Alice and Bob that want to establish a shared secret, and an eavesdropper, denoted as Eve. Fig. 2 illustrates the uncertainty of Eve even if she is positioned close to Bob. Each bar plot represents the received signal strength measurements on 16 channels in the 2.4 GHz range. Alice is placed in a fixed position on a desk, Bob is placed in an adjacent room such that both are separated by a wall, and the channel response is sampled from 12 positions on a 10 cm radius around Bob's position. The results show that the multipath effects are strong, and even if an attacker has knowledge of the environment and the positions of Alice from our extensive measurement campaign on the amount of uncertainty for adversaries are presented in Section IV-D.
C. System Model
We are interested in the amount of uncertainty that an adversary experiences. Information theory introduces the notion of (Shannon) entropy to quantify the average amount of information of a discrete random variable, making it suitable for capturing the amount of uncertainty an attacker experiences. In this section, we derive a stochastic model of our key generation scheme, enabling us to evaluate the strength of the generated keys with measurements in realistic scenarios.
Subsequently, we perform an experimental study to capture the signal behavior in realistic wireless channels. This allows quantifying the amount of uncertainty that the attacker experiences; we quantify its expected uncertainty with the entropy of the signal strength distributions of the channel.
1) Channel Model and Key Generation:
We formalize the key generation process as follows: the state of the wireless channel for a specified frequency at a certain point in time is captured by the discrete random variable C, that is, we assume that only finite precision can be achieved in channel state acquisition. Possible sources for this variable are, for example, the impulse response of the channel, or as in our case, the received signal strength. The outcome of C is stable during channel coherence time, which depends on the speed of movement. In static scenarios on which we focus this time is sufficiently long, enabling us to take several samples and use mean values of the channel state as outcomes of C.
Both Alice and Bob have access to the wireless channel and can exchange sampling messages directly. Each of them captures one of the random variables X Alice = C Alice + N Alice
with C x being the measured channel state at the respective position and N x being random variables representing the noise processes. With the help of channel reciprocity we can assume that C Alice = C Bob = C, i.e., both parties experience the same channel properties in their exchanged sampling messages. We drop this assumption later when we define a repair mechanism to eliminate such deviations. The mutual information of the channel is given by
The conditional entropy H (X Alice |X Bob ) is zero if the channel is noiseless, and then the amount of shared information that Alice and Bob gain by monitoring the channel is quantified by the entropy H (C) of the channel state variable with
where p (c) denotes the probability mass function of C and C its support. This also represents the maximum attainable mutual information of the channel because the noise term N = N Alice − N Bob has a negative effect on the mutual information [12] . We propose a reconciliation mechanism to correct the errors introduced at this point, presented in the next section. An eavesdropper monitoring the sampling message to infer the channel state C between Alice and Bob measures X Eve = C Eve + N Eve . As C and C Eve de-correlate rapidly in space, the mutual information I (X Alice ; X Eve ) and I (X Bob ; X Eve ) are approaching zero if the distance is greater than half a wavelength λ/2. Thus eavesdropping on the messages does not help Eve to infer information on C (see [13] for analytical results). The entropy H (C) holds against Eve, it quantifies the amount of uncertainty in the channel state for Eve.
2) Increasing the Key Length: However, the information on a single channel is limited, and a way must be identified to increase the amount of shared information between Alice and Bob. Two possibilities of increasing entropy can be considered: (i) create a random process C (t) by moving the devices (reducing the channel coherence time and changing the observed paths), or (ii) probe multiple channels to exploit the frequency-selectivity of the wireless channel. The first approach is followed in [7] , [8] , which is effective and easy to analyze for its security but, as pointed out, poses several problems for adoption in WSNs. To support static networks, we evaluate the second approach here.
We now consider the random vector C = (C 1 , . . . , C n ), measured on n different frequencies (channels). In this case, Alice measures X Alice = X (1) Alice , . . . , X (n) Alice and Bob measures the corresponding vector X Bob , which both can be used separately to obtain the mutual information 
Vector of measurements taken on channel i M = [μmin, μmax]
Set of possible outcomes of channel measurements μi, μ i ∈ M Mean values of the RSS samples (Alice, Bob) µ = (μ1, . . . , μn) , µ
Vector of means for all n channels (Alice, Bob) dis μi, μ i := μi − μ i Distance function used in the quantization process ti = dis μi, μ i Tolerance parameter against channel deviations T = (t1, . . . , tn)
Vector of tolerance values for n channels K Number of quantization levels used Qt = {q1, . . . , qK } Set of quantization levels with tolerance t bin (·) Binary representation of a quantization level q t (μ)
Quantization function used for error correction q = q t (μ)
Output of the quantization function, codeword
Public string used for information reconciliation P = (P1, . . . , Pn)
Vector of public strings for n channels secret, secret
Candidate bit string to be used as a shared secret nB Nonce generated by Bob during key verification {x} k Encryption of plaintext x using key k assuming reciprocity on all channels and H (C) being the joint entropy over all channels, given by
If the elements in the random vector are independent, then the amount of uncertainty depends only on the entropy values of individual channels,
This value represents an upper bound on the joint entropy, as known dependencies enable predictions and reduce the overall uncertainty of Eve. Wireless channels experience correlated fading when the distance between the center frequencies is smaller than the coherence bandwidth. This is the case in, e.g., the IEEE 802.15.4 standard we consider in this work. If it were not the case, the security analysis would be straightforward; yet, in Section IV we will not make that simplifying assumption.
III. PROTOCOL DESIGN
Next, we present our key generation protocol that is suitable even for limited hardware capabilities by using a performanceaware design, specifically with WSNs in mind. To assist the reader, a table of notations used is provided in Table I. In the following, we conduct measurements by sampling RSS values on a set of n different frequencies F = {f 1 , . . . , f n } (also referred to as channels). The number of samples taken is k, i.e., for each channel f i we collect a vector of measurements m i = m
. To increase the error tolerance of our scheme, we calculate the mean value
of these RSS samples. We view this mean value as the random variable C i , which is randomly distributed depending on the characteristics of wireless propagation, e.g., following the commonly assumed Rayleigh or Ricean distributions. The means of all n channels are combined into a random vector C = (C 1 , . . . , C n ). A realization, the outcome of our measurements is µ = (μ 1 , . . . , μ n ), with μ i ∈ M = [μ min , μ max ], the range of signal strength values that can be measured by the hardware platform. We assume that only a finite precision in the measurements can be achieved. As an example, in our wireless sensor network testbeds we used M = [−104, −40] dBm, with a precision depending on the number of samples taken, since each RSS sample is integer valued. We associate M with the distance function dis :
which is the deviation between the measurements of Alice and Bob (in dB) in our case. Thus, M together with this distance function constitutes a metric space, a necessary prerequisite for the discussion of our error correction scheme.
A. Multi-level Quantization
To successfully repair deviations in channel state measurements between Alice and Bob, we use multi-level quantization to remove small deviations in the measurements. In general, our quantization scheme Q uses a subset of the metric space M, Q = {q 1 , . . . , q K } ⊆ M, with a total of K elements, the quantization levels. The most important property of the quantization scheme is the tolerance t of the quantization Q. This is the largest distance for which an m ∈ M is mapped uniquely, i.e., for all μ i ∈ M, we have dis (μ i , q) < t for at most one q ∈ Q. Therefore, all values μ i , μ i are mapped to q given their distance to q is small enough, removing deviations in the measurements of Alice and Bob. Because this operation can be viewed as a lossy encoding of μ, we refer to q as the codeword of μ.
Construction: We choose K elements of M with the same distance d between quantization levels, where p = log 2 K is the number of bits needed to identify a level. This equidistance ensures that the tolerance t is the same for all values in M. We denote this quantization as Q t = {q 1 , . . . , q K }, the bijective mapping to the binary representation as bin : Q t → {0, 1} p , which maps codewords to binary strings. Since μ min and μ max are fixed values, the distance d between neighboring quantization levels is reduced as the number of levels increases. This relation is given by d = |μmax−μmin| K . The tolerance of this scheme is given by t = d 2 , since all levels are evenly spaced. The number of levels therefore directly affects the tolerance of the quantization scheme, thus, when fewer levels are considered, larger deviations can be repaired. The process of quantization maps a value μ to the codeword q with minimal distance in R, formally
For example, consider the quantization scheme
with 32 levels and tolerance t = 1 for our metric space M. For this, the measured value μ = −71.424 dBm is quantized to the codeword q = −72.
B. Tolerance Properties of the Quantization Scheme
The entropy of the measurements is reduced in the quantization process because several values are mapped to the same codeword, but at the same time the tolerance for deviations is increased. Thus, we can trade between robustness and security by choosing a Q t with a suitable tolerance t ∈ R that is able to correct all errors in measurements, i.e., max i dis (μ i , μ i ) < t.
Still, some constellations are possible such that μ and μ are mapped to two different codewords (e.g., given Q 1 , μ = −70.9 dBm and μ = −71.1 dBm are mapped to −70 and Alice Bob −72, respectively). To correct such error patterns we need to send public information P that helps Bob to reconcile his measurement and recover the same quantization results as Alice. Of course, at the same time P should reveal a minimum of new information to Eve.
Our construction is straightforward: Alice calculates P = q t (μ) − μ, the shift that is necessary from μ to the corresponding quantization value q A = q t (μ), and uses q A as her secret information. Alice then sends P via public channel to Bob, who uses P to generate the codeword q B using his measurement μ by calculating q B = q t (μ + P ). Claim 1. By using this reconciliation scheme, Alice and Bob obtain q A = q B , given dis (μ, μ ) < t.
Proof: Considering dis (μ, μ ) < t, the distance between the mean values is unchanged when both sides are shifted by P , i.e., dis (μ + P, μ + P ) < t. From the construction of P , we can infer that q A = q t (μ) = μ + P , and thus dis (q A , μ + P ) < t. Finally, as the quantization distance of the used scheme is t, μ + P is uniquely mapped to q A by Bob as well, q B = q t (μ + P ) = q A .
We remark that this reconciliation scheme between Alice and Bob leaks some information to Eve: the distribution in the quantization intervals [q t (μ) − t, q t (μ) + t] is biased depending on μ. The strength of this bias and thus the amount of information leaking due to the reconciliation is determined by how far these distributions are away from being uniform. If the tolerance is set not too high, the information leakage is low as in small intervals the deviation from uniform is only slight. To illustrate the latter statement more quantitatively, let us assume that Eve possesses the information on the distribution of the RSS values between Alice and Bob, for example, a Normal distribution (as Fig. 6(a) suggests). Eve could then "bet" on the most likely quantization interval given P . For the Normal distribution as in Fig. 6(a) , we can calculate an upper bound on the information leakage (in bits) as the maximum Kullback-Leibler divergence [14] between the partial Normal distributions for the quantization intervals and respective uniform distributions over all quantization intervals. In this particular but representative case, we obtain for t = 0.5, 1, 2, 4 an upper bound on the information leakage of 0.06, 0.15, 0.37 and 1.04 bits per channel, respectively. Hence, we observe that only for a large tolerance the information leakage due to the reconciliation scheme becomes significant.
C. Key Generation Protocol
The proposed key generation protocol operates in three phases (see also Fig. 3 ).
1) In the sampling phase, the channel state is acquired, and because of the channel reciprocity strongly correlated measurements are collected by the two legitimate protocol parties. 2) In the key generation phase, possible deviations are corrected, resulting in a shared secret bit string that is guaranteed to be equal if the deviations are bounded and suitable tolerances (quantization levels) are chosen.
3)
The key verification phase ensures key agreement. After successful execution of the key generation protocol, both Alice and Bob share a mutual secret.
1) Sampling Phase: In this initial phase, Alice and Bob exchange training messages over the set of available channels. For each of the n frequencies in F , Alice and Bob exchange k messages and each of them stores a set of measured RSS values, m i or m i , respectively. Alice initiates the message exchanges, Bob responds to incoming messages instantly to ensure a maximum of channel reciprocity. The samples are collected in an interleaved manner due to hardware constraints, such that the state of the wireless channel might change and the reciprocity is reduced, contributing to the noise terms N Alice and N Bob . However, by using several training messages per channel, the adverse effects of such short term deviations is mitigated. The mean values μ i = 1 k k j=1 m (j) i are then computed by Alice, while Bob proceeds in the same manner with μ i . Thus, after finishing the sampling phase, both Alice and Bob possess the vectors of channel state information µ and µ that capture the fading behavior of the wireless channel.
2) Key Generation Phase: The gathered mean value vectors µ and µ contain secret information that can already be used as secret keys, but after the sampling phase these vectors are unlikely to fully agree for Alice and Bob. The key generation phase uses information reconciliation based on the error correction scheme (Section III-B) to produce a matching bit string, without unnecessarily discarding shared bits. Alice proceeds to choose a set of tolerance values T = (t 1 , . . . , t n ) based on the number of experienced verification errors (the variable error_count in Fig. 3 ) from potential previous runs. We used the same starting tolerance value t i = 1 for all channels in our experiments and analysis, which achieves a high rate of successful key agreements as well as strong keys, as shown experimentally with our implementation (Section IV), and increase this value by 0.5 in case of a verification error. However the choice of tolerance values influences the robustness and security trade-off and considering further optimization at this point may be useful.
Alice uses the tolerance values to instantiate the appropriate quantization functions q ti and applies them on her mean values μ i to generate the codewords q i for each channel. She also generates the vector of public reconciliation strings P = (P 1 , . . . , P n ) by calculating P i = q i − μ i to aid Bob in his error correction and to ensure matching secrets. He can then generate his quantization level vector by calculating q i = q t (μ i + P i ). Both parties now have sufficient information to generate their candidate secrets secret and secret by concatenating the resulting binary strings.
3) Key Verification Phase: Finally, both parties proceed to verify if the secret keys are generated successfully, i.e., whether a mutual secret is established. After Bob has finished his computations, he generates a fresh random nonce n B , encrypts it with his candidate secret secret , and sends the result {n B } secret to Alice. Alice decrypts the message with her own secret, calculates n B − 1, and sends the encrypted result {n B − 1} secret back. Bob ensures successful key generation by decrypting the message and comparing Alice's value to his local n B − 1. If the values do not match, Alice can retry the key generation phase by increasing the error count and choosing new tolerance values; repeating the sampling phase is not required. The approach used in our implementation uses a tolerance increase of 0.5 dB on each channel (non-integer values are possible because we use RSS means). However, our experimental results in the next section show that with a tolerance t = 1, key agreement was reached in 94.6 % of the cases on the first try. After finishing this step, both Alice and Bob share a common secret bit string.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS
After the definition of the key generation protocol, the next goal is to evaluate the performance in real-world environments and to quantify the achievable security and robustness given realistic propagation properties. We also show that the concept is applicable on resource-constrained devices under realistic channel properties. The first part is focused on the robustness and performance of the protocol, and in the second part the security is quantified empirically using the notion of information entropy. These insights are also used as a basis and justification for the analytical model developed in Section V. 
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A. Implementation Details
We implemented the protocol on MICAz devices running TinyOS 2.1.1. The overall binary image size is 11 kB for both Alice and Bob, which is half the size of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC)-based implementations with comparable strength (22 kB for an 80 bit security level [15] ). In addition, a detailed breakdown of resource usage 1 (shown in Table II) reveals that most resources are claimed by modules for communications, scheduling, or timer services that can be re-used by WSN applications. The binary image of the protocol code [15] . In terms of runtime complexity, the sampling phase is the most demanding with the mean computation (O (nk) summations and shift operations, and O (k) words in memory). In comparison, ECC-based solutions require a number of computations on the order of 10 6 -10 7 for a single key exchange and several seconds of computing time [4] .
B. WSN Testbed and Methodology
The experiments were conducted over several days on a university floor, an indoor setting across several rooms. During the measurements, several wireless LAN access points were operating concurrently in the 2.4 GHz band; thus the experiments were performed in a real-world environment with unpredictable factors. The environment contained concrete walls as well as office furniture made of various materials.
In this setting, several scenarios are considered to evaluate the impact of positioning on security and robustness. A large meeting room is used for experiments where the devices constantly maintain a line of sight connection, and several smaller office rooms are used to quantify the impact of shadowing objects and walls. For each of these scenarios, 250 positions are considered, with a fixed distance of 2.5 m to avoid the influence of variable path loss. In long-term and dynamic scenarios, these rooms and the connecting corridors are used, and 1100 additional positions are tested with mixed distances and obstacles. As the protocols parameters, we probe on n = 16 channels, using k = 16 samples on each channel.
C. Protocol Robustness
In order to evaluate the robustness of the protocol, a total of 1600 positions of the two parties are tested and the measurements and deviations between the two parties recorded for each of the 16 channels.
From the deviations N = N Alice − N Bob observed, we see that they are bounded. The histogram of deviations is given in Figs. 4(a) and 4(b) , which also show that these deviations are fitted well by a zero-mean Normal distribution with a standard deviation of σ = 0.46 dB in the LOS experiment and σ = 0.5 dB in the non-LOS experiment. The empirical distributions have even lighter tails than the fitted Normal distributions. Based on the experiments, we conclude that the reciprocity of the wireless channel is sufficiently strong.
The success ratio of the protocol is directly controlled by the used tolerance values, because larger tolerance values are able to correct stronger deviations. With a tolerance of 1 dB, 94.6 % of the key agreements are successful on the first run. This value is increased to 99.2 % with a tolerance of 2 dB. The empirical cumulative distribution function (ECDF) of all experiments is shown in Fig. 4(c) . The majority of deviations are below 2 dB, and only a small number of extreme outliers occur. Because the chosen tolerance value also has an impact on the strength of the resulting bit string, a trade-off between security and robustness must be found.
D. Evaluation of the Channel Entropy
We evaluated the frequency-selective channel fading effects in two different environmental settings: (i) connections with line of sight (LOS) only; and (ii) connections with obstacles in the direct connection (non-LOS). The LOS experiment was intended as the worst-case scenario because a strong LOS component may be able to dominate the multipath fading behavior. Yet, our experiments show that this is rarely the case, and both experiments yield approximately the same entropy. In all experiments, several tolerance values are considered to evaluate the impact of this parameter on the security.
Independent channels assumption: The security analysis focuses on the distribution of signal strength measurements, especially on the entropy that these distributions possess. The evaluation of the entropy for single channels is straightforward: we use the empirical distribution of codewords after quantization to calculate H (C i ) for each of the n channels individually, using the relative frequencies as the estimates of codeword probabilities. For example, this analysis shows that there are 3.5 bits of entropy in each channel when using a tolerance value of t = 1; a value of t = 0.5 results in an increase to 4.38 bits per channel. The joint entropy under the assumption of independent channels is the sum of the channels' entropy values. For example, using the 16 channels of IEEE 802.15.4, this protocol generates keys with an entropy of 56 bit resp. 70 bit.
Analyzing dependent channels: However, independence cannot be assumed if the channels are within the coherence bandwidth (as in the case of IEEE 802.15.4), and using the conventional approach to estimate the Shannon entropy of dependent channels using sampling is not effective as this becomes prohibitive in memory space with larger dimensions. Additionally, the unknown dependence structure of the generated secret strings makes such quantification hard. The reason is that the Shannon entropy operates on the knowledge of the underlying joint distribution, which is unknown in our case. While in the next section we derive a stochastic model for such an analysis, we are still interested in finding out how much uncertainty is present in the experimental data without any assumptions on the channel fading, i.e., without requiring any a priori knowledge. The idea we follow is based on the notion of construction (or Kolmogorov) complexity [16] , [17] , which can be quantified using T-complexity [18] . T-complexity quantifies the difficulty to decompose strings into codewords of T-codes, i.e., the complexity when trying to find the minimal string representation. Speidel et al. [19] show in their work that T-complexity is the fastest to converge to the real value of the Shannon entropy, and provide an algorithm that enables fast computations of entropy values. The tool tcalc [20] , developed by the same group, was used in our evaluation. As a result, we are able to capture the dependencies between channels in the empirical data without explicitly knowing them. The results from this analysis are discussed in the next subsection and in Section V-A, where we also use them for the validation of the derived stochastic model.
Results from the experimental analysis:
A comparison of results showing the entropy in the experimental data is shown in Fig. 5 . With a tolerance value of t = 1, the entropy under the independence assumption is 56 bit for both LOS and non-LOS connections. When considering the dependencies in the measurements, 31 bit of entropy is achieved with a limited number of channels and precision that the sensor mote hardware offers. Lower tolerance values increase the strength of generated keys. For example, a tolerance value of t = 0.4, which has a 56 % chance of successful key agreement, offers 45-50 secret bits even when considering dependent channels.
Secret bits application notes:
We note that the generated bit strings are not uniformly distributed, as implied by entropy values smaller than one per generated bit. Rather, the entropy of generated shared secrets in this setting is comparable with conventional password-based security schemes and can be applied to protocols such as commitment-based authentication using short authenticated strings (e.g., [21] , [22] , [23] , [24] , [25] ). Similarly, protocols such as the Encrypted Key-Exchange (EKE) apply short shared secrets for confidential exchange of public key material (e.g., [26] , [27] ). The shared secrets in such applications are usually provided by a user and contain approximately 18 bit entropy due to dependency between characters (for a overview of password entropy, see [28] ). Since these protocols play an important role in wireless networks as part of device-pairing schemes, generating secrets from the wireless channel can be seen as a valuable extension and alternative to requiring users to generate and input secret keys [29] . If strong secrets are required, related work suggests to apply privacy amplification on the generated secret, i.e., to extract randomness and increase the entropy of each bit at the cost of key length [30] . Dodis et al. [31] introduce randomness extractors and describe constructions that use universal hash functions to compact the secrets.
V. INCREASING THE STRENGTH OF A SECRET
The experimental analysis shows that the dependencies between channels have a non-negligible influence on the security of the proposed protocol. In contrast to previous sections, we now develop a stochastic model that makes these dependencies explicit and enables us to analyze and predict ways to increase the achievable security. In particular, we want to answer questions such as: What is the impact of increasing the number of available channels? and What is the benefit of increasing the spacing between center frequencies? To derive a realistic model of dependent wireless channels, we start with fitting and validating the distribution of single channel measurements and then extending it to the multivariate case that captures the dependencies between channels. The model is validated by comparing the resulting entropy values with our empirical results.
A. Modeling Channel Dependency
Frequently used distributions for large-scale models of wireless channels are Rayleigh, Ricean, or Log-Normal [9, §4.9, §5.6], depending on the properties of the respective propagation environment. Also, in scenarios common to WLANs and WSNs where distances between transceivers are small, the empirical data can be approximated by the Normal distribution [32] , [33] , [34] . To test for an adequate distribution, we collected 4000 RSS sample means for each of the LOS and non-LOS scenarios, where every RSS mean was calculated over 16 measurements, determining the distribution parameters using Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE). The resulting fit of the Rayleigh and Normal distributions to the empirical data is shown in Fig. 6(a) . Additionally, we tested the normality of the sampled data using the probability plot correlation coefficient test for Normality (PPCC), which is based on checking for linearity between the theoretical quantiles and the sample data [35] . In fact, the goodness of fit test confirms that the Normal distribution (with a correlation coefficient of 0.992) can be assumed with an even higher confidence than the corresponding Rayleigh distribution (with a correlation coefficient of 0.967).
In this case, the multivariate Normal distribution is a good candidate to describe the complex dependency structures of wireless channels by directly estimating the covariance matrix from the empirical data [36] .
Using the multivariate Normal distribution: Hence, to analyze the dependencies of the joint distribution over all 16 wireless channels, especially with respect to the joint entropy, we model the signal strength values of different channels using a single 16-dimensional multivariate Normal distribution. The distribution parameter estimation is straightforward: the vector of mean values µ, which is in case of the Normal distribution already the MLE for the population mean, and for the covariance matrix Σ we used the MLE method:
Finally, we validated the multivariate channel dependency model against our empirical data by using the same error correction mechanism (described in Section III) to generate keys and to compare the Shannon entropy of the empirical data Empirical result (line) Prediction model with a confidence level of 95 % Fig. 8 . Prediction of the differential entropy using only a subset of available channels. Even with a small number of channels, an accurate prediction is possible.
with the results of the model. The results of this evaluation are given in Fig. 7 , which shows the resulting entropy values for the non-LOS data applying the same analysis methods used in the experimental analysis. The results of the LOS experiment are omitted because the observed behavior is similar. The model captures the dependency structure well, resulting in a similar shape of the curve for the existing tolerance values, although the entropy is slightly overestimated by our model. Entropy analysis using the model: Using this model, we estimate the amount of entropy considering additional resources such as a higher number of channels or a larger spacing between channels. We only need to consider the properties of the covariance matrix Σ with respect to entropy.
The differential entropy (in natural units) of the multivariate Normal distribution is given by
depending on the number of channels n and the determinant of Σ. The first-order effect of increasing the number of channels is easy to quantify, the differential entropy is increased by 2.05 bits for each additional channel. However, the relationship is not obvious with respect to the determinant. In the case of independence, only the main diagonal of the covariance matrix is populated, but in the general case the complete matrix has an influence that is difficult to quantify.
B. Predicting the Key Length using the Model
First, we consider the effects of the determinant on the security given a larger number of channels (while keeping the spacing between channels constant). To this end, we extrapolate the covariance matrix and evaluate the effect on the determinant. Two different prediction methods are used, one that extrapolates Σ directly and another that also simulates the effect of larger spacing between center frequencies and then extrapolates the matrix.
Increasing the number of channels: We used (i×i) submatrices with i = 1, . . . , 15 of the matrix Σ to predict the 16×16 matrix Σ. Only the values contained in the submatrix are used, in the following manner: each diagonal is treated independently, as it represents a different lag in the covariances. The missing elements of the matrix are chosen uniformly from a range between minimum and maximum values on the respective diagonal. The results of this 16×16 prediction for the non-LOS experiment are shown in Fig. 8 . A sample of 100 extrapolated covariance matrices was used to predict the known amount of differential entropy for 16 channels, the confidence level used in the graph is 95 %. The horizontal line represents a differential entropy using the entire matrix Σ from the experiments. The predicted entropy using different sub-matrix sizes is shown, obtained from mean values of different uniform extrapolations. Even with small 2×2 prediction matrices, it is possible to estimate the entropy accurately. The evaluation for the LOS experiment is omitted but returned similar results. Thus, we can use the estimation of Σ to predict the entropy from a larger number of channels.
Increasing the channel spacing: The second matrix extrapolation method was used to evaluate the effects of a larger spacing between the channels. Only every second (third, nth) diagonal was used and the remaining ones were removed in this analysis. This simulates a channel spacing of 10 MHz (15 MHz, 5n MHz). This smaller matrix is then extrapolated in the same fashion as described before. The quality of prediction is comparable to the previous results.
Analytical results: Fig. 9 shows the increases of entropy we observe with our model; the figure shows the results of the non-LOS experiment only, the LOS experiment yielded similar results. The results are given in differential entropy, which does not take the tolerances into account. The lowest line describes the increase in joint differential entropy if we use the same determinant we obtained from 16 channels. This results in an increase of 2.05 bits for each channel, but it is also a conservative prediction, as it overestimates the dependencies between channels with center frequencies spaced far apart from each other. Using extrapolation based on the 16×16 matrix and calculating the entropy using Eq. (1) and the new Σ, we see an increase of 4.02 bits for each additional channel. The dashed line shows an additional gain if the channels are spaced 10 MHz apart, instead of the 5 MHz spacing in our experiments, yielding a 4.25 bit increase. Our model shows that there are several ways to increase the key length generated by the proposed protocol. It is feasible to generate more bits on each channel with measurements of higher precision, but as this may increase the hardware costs, it is advisable to rather use a larger number of channels.
VI. RELATED WORK
While there is a large body of work on this topic, in this section we restrict ourselves to system implementations that apply the concept of key generation using shared random sources. For an overview of the results in the theory of this concept, see, e.g., the work of Mukherjee et al. [6] .
Signal strength based approaches: Several research groups applied the concept to wireless communication systems to generate secret keys from signal propagation properties, providing insights into the feasibility and reliability in realistic settings. Mathur et al. [7] use the randomness of the received signal strength that is generated by movement as a source for correlated information, the so-called "radio-telepathy." The authors employ a level-crossing algorithm with two thresholds to turn signal strength values into bit strings. For information reconciliation, both parties detect mutual threshold excursions by exchanging suitable candidate regions in the sequence. In contrast to our work, their solution requires movement as a generator of randomness and thus it is not applicable in resource-constrained static networks.
Azimi-Sadjadi et al. [8] propose a similar protocol that focuses mainly on the robustness of the key generation process, i.e., to achieve tolerance against channel deviations and a high success ratio. The authors employ a single threshold for detection of severe signal drops (deep fades) introduced by movement. Because not all generated bits in their scheme are equally unpredictable, the authors consider the use of randomness extractors to produce uniformly random strings.
Further results on such key extraction protocols, especially with respect to the effectiveness in realistic scenarios, are given by Jana et al. [37] .
The problem of resource-constrained devices has also inspired research in the same direction as this article. Croft et al. [38] consider movement-based key generation protocols for WSN. Ali et al. [39] provide a similar study for body area networks. However, both works do not consider the use of multiple channels to support static networks. Our preliminary results outline the protocol implementation and some experimental results [29] , [40] , [41] . Here, we present new experimental results, and a detailed analytical model that captures the inter-dependencies between channels. As subsequent work, other authors applied our approach of exploiting frequency-selective channels in the context of body area networks [42] .
Recently, Eberz et al. [43] analyze the security of physicallayer key generation protocols under a sophisticated active adversary. They show that during the channel sampling phase, the adversary can identify opportunities to jam and inject messages that result in symmetric, yet predictable quantizations. As a result, a significant part of the generated secret key may be disclosed to the adversary. That paper indicates that there is a need for a better understanding of active adversaries against key generation protocols, and the development of methods to detect and mitigate such attacks.
Other approaches: Several other contributions use specialized hardware with additional capabilities such as electronically steerable antennas [44] , ultra-wideband (UWB) radios [10] , [45] or multi-antenna systems in combination with laptop-class processors [46] to extract shared randomness from the wireless channel. In particular, Hamida et al. [45] propose an adaptive multi-level quantization protocol for key generation in UWB networks. In contrast, this paper focuses on the capabilities of conventional off-the-shelf sensor motes, without the need for additional equipment.
Another source of correlated randomness are biometric data [31] , Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) [47] , or sensors readings [48] . However, all of these approaches require user interaction or dedicated sensors to generate input, which is often unavailable in WSN installations.
iJam [49] uses jamming to mask transmitted bits to eavesdroppers to achieve secure key distribution by exploiting the physical layer of wireless networks. However, this system explicitly requires higher-order modulations such as OFDM to ensure that the jammed signal is indistinguishable from valid signals, as well as a tight timing synchronization between sender and receiver, making it unsuitable for WSNs.
VII. CONCLUSION
Secret key generation and distribution poses one of the main security challenges in wireless networks, especially in computationally limited WSNs. Taking advantage of physical properties of signal propagation, mutual secrets between wireless transmitters can be derived with greatly reduced computational complexity. Although this approach for securing wireless networks has been recently addressed by others [7] , [8] , these protocols require continuous movement as a randomness source. Although valuable to mobile networks, such solutions are not applicable to the majority of WSN applications, which are based on static devices.
The main focus of this work was to overcome this limitation. We started by introducing a system model based on real-world measurements using IEEE 802.15.4 technology, and describing building blocks of a novel key generation protocol. To demonstrate its applicability, the protocol was implemented and evaluated using MICAz sensor motes. Our experiments show that the protocol is able to successfully generate keys in over 97 % of the cases in realistic settings, and, even when using a limited number of channels, the proposed protocol provides secrets up to 50 bits. A stochastic model derived in this work and validated by experimental data provides guidelines on how to increase the length of the secret keys based on either increasing the number of channels or increasing the channel spacing. For example, if the number of channels of the present IEEE 802.15.4 is increased to 40, this protocol can generate up to 160 bit strong secrets in static scenarios.
